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Abstract. This paper presents the Speech Technology Center (STC)
replay attack detection systems proposed for Automatic Speaker Verifi-
cation Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge 2017. In this study we
focused on comparison of different spoofing detection approaches. These
were GMM based methods, high level features extraction with simple
classifier and deep learning frameworks. Experiments performed on the
development and evaluation parts of the challenge dataset demonstrated
stable efficiency of deep learning approaches in case of changing acoustic
conditions. At the same time SVM classifier with high level features pro-
vided a substantial input in the efficiency of the resulting STC systems
according to the fusion systems results.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, due to increasing security concerns in all aspects of our daily lives,
the need for convenient and non-intrusive authentication methods has grown.
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) offers a low-cost and reliable solution for
identification problem when voice services are provided. It is already used in so-
cial security entitlement, immigration control and election management. Speaker
recognition systems are widely used in customer identification during call to a
call center, Internet-banking systems and other fields of e-commerce. However,
despite the fact that it has reached the point of mass market adoption this
technology is acknowledged to be vulnerable to spoofing attacks [1].
According to the [2] ASV spoofing attacks can be classified into direct and
indirect attacks acording to the stage they are applied to. Indirect ones require
access to the system and attack inner modules (feature extraction module, voice
models, classification results). In opposite, direct attacks use the recording stage
or transmission level and is focused on the substitution of the input data. Since
speaker verification is mostly used in automatic systems without face-to-face
contact, direct attacks are more likely to be used by criminals due to imple-
mentation simplicity. The most well-known spoofing attacks are impersonation,
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replay attack (RA), voice conversion (VC) attack and text-to-speech (TTS) at-
tack [3], [4].
Unlike other spoofing types, impersonation does not leave any traces of the
recording and playback devices or signal processing, as it is genuine speech of a
non-target speaker. It can be detected by reliable speaker verification system [5].
TTS and VC detection methods were the topic of Automatic Speaker Verification
Spoofing (ASVspoof) 2015 Challenge [6]. Results presented during that challenge
confirmed the great potential in detection of VC and TTS. Compared to these
spoofing types RA is much more simpler as it’s realisation does not require
specific audio signal processing knowledges. In RA fraudster usually uses pre-
recorded speech samples of the target speaker that can be easily prepared via
low-cost recording devices or smartphones. Due to this RA is the most available
and therefore critical spoofing technique.
For today there is a small number of studies addressed to the RA detection.
The most part of solutions presented for text-dependent ASV are based on the
comparison of the test utterance with the stored utterance recorded during the
registration. Vulnerability of text-independent ASV to RA was considered in [3]
and [7]. These papers show the serious increase in false acceptance rate of ASV
system in case of RA presence. RA detection methods for text-independent case
are mostly based on additional noise detection, specific for pre-defined acoustic
conditions.
The second edition of ASVspoof Challenge conducted in 2017 was aimed to
promote the development of RA countermeasures reliable to both known and
unknown conditions [8] which can vary greatly. ASVspoof 2017 was focused on a
standalone RA detection task for text-dependent case considered without ASV
system and any pre-recorded enroll data.
In this paper we described Speech Technology Center (STC) RA detection
systems proposed for ASVspoof 2017. Here we investigated and compared dif-
ferent approaches for spoofing detection. These were Gaussian Mixture Model
(GMM) based systems, systems based on high level features with simple classifier
and deep learning approaches.
2 Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing Detection
Challenge 2017
ASVspoof Challenge was organized in order to assess the potential to detect
RA ”in the wild”, specifically in varying acoustic conditions. For this purpose
the spoofing database was collected using text-dependent RedDots data [9]. Red-
Dots corpus was replayed and recaptured in heterogeneous acoustic environment
(open lab space, balcony, etc.). For spoofing trials 15 different playback and 16
recording devices were used, including smartphones and high-quality speakers.
The original RedDots records were used as genuine speech trials. This dataset
was divided into training, development and evaluation parts. The evaluation part
contained no information about spoofing trials, devices and recording conditions.
Spoofing trials from evaluation part were prepared with the use of devices that
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were not used in the recording process of the training or development data. In
this way they presented previously unforeseen spoofing attacks.
3 GMM approach
Authors of [10] insist that spoofing detection methods should be more focused
on the feature engineering rather than on models complication. They proposed
the system based on constant Q transform cepstral coefficients (CQCC) and
simple GMM. This approach showed impressive results on the ASVspoof 2015
dataset and achieved the 72% improvement over the best system participated
in the challenge. That is why the reference implementation of this system was
provided as a Baseline system by organisers of ASVspoof 2017.
3.1 Baseline
Constant Q transform (CQT) is widely used in music signal processing. By
using geometrically spaced frequency bins it overcomes the lack of frequency
resolution at lower frequencies and time resolution at higher frequencies that
can be produced by Fourier transform with regular space frequency bins. Figure
1 demonstrates the example of CQT spectrum. CQCC estimated according to
the scheme in Figure 2 were used as input features in the Baseline system.
In the Back-End the Baseline system used standard 2-class GMM classifier.
512-component models were trained with an expectation-maximisation (EM)
algorithm with random initialisation for genuine and spoofed speech, respec-
tively. For each utterance the log-likelihood score was obtained from GMM
models and the final score was computed as the log-likelihood ratio: Λ(X) =
logL(X|θg)− logL(X|θs), where X is a sequence of test utterance feature vec-
tors, L denotes the likelihood function, and θg and θs represent the GMM for
genuine and spoofed speech.
Fig. 1. Log power magnitude CQT spectrum Fig. 2. CQCC features extraction
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3.2 Baseline modifications
The first modifications we tried were normalization techniques for acoustic fea-
tures. We considered mean and variance normalization on the log power spec-
trum (mvn) and cepstral coefficients (cmvn) in different combinations. We have
also tried acoustic features that were effective for VC and TTS detection. These
were Mel Wavelet Packet Coefficients (MWPC), based on applying the multires-
olution wavelet transform and phase-based features CosPhasePC [11].
Experiments results obtained on the development part (Table 1) confirm the
efficiency of normalization for CQCC based systems. Systems with other Front-
End features did not outperform these results.
Table 1. Experimental results for GMM-based systems obtained on the development
and evaluation parts of ASVspoof 2017 database (EER %)
Features CQCC MWPC MWPC CosPhasePC
Normalization - mvn cmvn mvn+cmvn - cmvn -
train EER (%) 0.03 1.81 1.25 1.1 0.4 0.23 0.43
dev EER (%) 10.35 8.74 11.86 9.85 8.81 19.17 24.64
4 I-vector based system
4.1 SVMi-vector
The most efficient spoofing detection systems on ASVspoof 2015 were based on
high level features modelling by standard i-vector approach [12]. Inspired by
its success for VC ans TTS spoofing detection we proposed similar approach for
RA detection. We experimented with variety of acoustic features from ASVspoof
2015, such as MFCC, CosPhasePC and MWPC features. According to our obser-
vations the best system was the system based on the Linear Prediction Cepstral
Coefficients (LPCC).
78 LPCC coefficients were obtained using the Hanning window function with
a 0.128 seconds window size and a 0.016 seconds step for FFT power spectrum
estimation [13]. I-vectors of the Total Variability space were extracted from the
whole speaker utterances. Here we used the the 128-component Gaussian mix-
ture model of the described features for diagonal covariance UBM (Universal
Background Model), and the dimension of the T-matrix was 200. After center-
ing and length-normalization i-vectors were used as an input for a linear kernel
SVM classifier. For SVM training the efficient LIBLINEAR [14] library was used.
4.2 Phrase-dependent system
During our investigations we suggested that phrase-dependent system can per-
form a higher accuracy than text-independent system. We compared i-vector
Vbased system with the similar systems trained for several different phrases inde-
pendently. Our experiments presented in Table 2 showed reduction in spoofing
detection in comparison with the common systems trained on the whole training
dataset. This effect can be explained by the insufficient size of the training data
in a phrase-dependent case which leads to fast overfitting.
Table 2. Experimental results for the i-vector based system obtained on the develop-
ment and evaluation parts of ASVspoof 2017 database (EER %)
UBM phrase-dependent common common common
T-matrix phrase-dependent phrase-dependent common common
SVM phrase-dependent phrase-dependent phrase-dependent common
train EER (%) 0.398 0.133 0.401 1.459
dev EER (%) 11.702 12.368 11.447 9.95
5 Deep learning approaches
Deep learning approaches have already achieved remarkable performance in
many classification and recognition tasks. The success of CNN in video clas-
sification [15], image classification [16,17], face recognition [18] prompts to apply
such approaches for ASV anti-spoofing tasks. The idea of employing CNN for
spoofing detection is not new and was used in face spoofing detection [19], [20].
Several experimental results confirm the efficiency of CNN based approaches
for synthetic speech detection. For example in [21] authors demonstrated high
efficiency of deep neural network (DNN), CNN and recurrent neural network
(RNN) architectures for VC and TTS spoofing detection on the base of ASVspoof
2015 dataset. They also proposed a stacked CNN+RNN architecture and demon-
strated its state-of-the-art performance. It is particularly important to note that
CNN architecture showed similar to CNN+RNN results and their fusion out-
performed the best individual system twice in terms of detection quality. In [22]
temporal CNN architectures were proposed for VC and TTS detection. This
approach also achieved notable results on the ASVspoof 2015 corpora.
In this section we describe several systems based on CNN frameworks for
RA spoofing detection. Such problem can be reduced to the detection of local
spectral artifacts presented in the reproduced replay attack that distinguish it
from the genuine speech. For this purpose the CNN was used as a robust feature
extractor from the input signal representation in a time-frequency domain.
5.1 Unified shape time-frequency features
In our research we chose 2 types of features based on spectrum estimation of the
utterance. To prepare CNN input acoustic features we used the normalized log
power magnitude spectrum obtained via:
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– constant Q transform (CQT) [10]
– Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
– Discrete wavelet Transform (DWT), obtained by Daubechies wavelets db4
Special attention should be paid here to the fact that CNN input data should
have a unified form. We considered two techniques for obtaining a unified time-
frequency (T-F) shape of features. First one truncates the spectrum along the
time axis with a fixed size. During this procedure short files are extended by
repeating their contents if necessary to match the required length. The other
technique uses a sliding window approach with a fixed window size.
5.2 Deep Learning architectures
It is known from image processing that the choice of convolutional neural network
architecture is a critical task and greatly affects learning result. In this research
we investigated several deep neural network architectures, demonstrated the best
results in RA detection.
Inception CNN based system ICNNSWCQT The first proposed neural net-
work architecture was CNN with inception modules (ICNN) ([23]). The proposed
architecture was the reduced version of GoogLeNet and contained 3 inception
modules. Inception module acts as multiple convolution filter inputs, that are
processed on the same input in parallel. It also does pooling at the same time. All
resulting feature maps are then concatenated before going to the next layer. This
allows the model to pick the best convolutions and take advantages of multi-level
feature extraction by recovering both local feature via smaller convolutions and
high abstracted features with larger convolutions.
The ICNN was applied for high level feature extraction from the log power
magnitude CQT spectrum. The last fully-connected (FC) layer with softmax ac-
tivation function was used to discriminate between genuine and spoofing classes
during the training process. And a low-dimensional high-level audio representa-
tion was extracted from the penultimate FC layer.
To obtain unified time-frequency representation of the audio-signal we used
sliding window technique with 864× 200× 1 window size and 90% overlapping.
For ICNN input we applied mean variance normalization.
Since in this space of high level features genuine and replay spoofing classes
are well separated, it was enough to use the simplest one-component models for
each class distribution modelling. We used the standard 2-class GMM classifier
(1 GMM for genuine speech and 1 for spoofed speech) trained on the training
part of the ASVspoof 2017 database with EM algorithm. The score for an input
signal was computed as the loglikelihood ratio. In this scenario we extracted high-
level features independently for each sliding window and all high-level features
corresponding to one utterance were used to estimate GMM likelihood. However,
it should be mentioned that such deep neural approach can be used for End-To-
End solution without additional classifier.
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Light CNN The second CNN we explored was the reduced version of the LCNN
proposed in [24] with a smaller number of filters in each layer. LCNN consisted
of 5 convolution layers, 4 Network in Network (NIN) layers [25], 10 Max-Feature-
Map layers, 4 max-pooling layers and 2 fully connected layers [26]. The proposed
LCNN used Max-Feature-Map activation function that allows to reduce CNN
architecture. In contrast to commonly used Rectified Linear Unit function that
suppresses a neuron by a threshold (or bias), MFM suppresses a neuron by a
competitive relationship. In this way being applied in particular MFM selects
more informative features. Each convolution layer was a combination of two
independent convolutional parts calculated for layer’s input. MFM activation
function was used then to calculate element-wise maximum of these parts. Max-
Pooling layers with kernel of size 2 × 2 and stride of size 2 × 2 were used for
time and frequency dimensions reduction. Described CNN was used to obtain
high-level audio features similar to the ICNN based system and simple GMM
classifier was used at the evaluation stage.
We proposed a number of systems based on LCNN high-level features extrac-
tor with different acoustic features. LCNNCQT used truncated features obtained
from the normalized CQT spectrograms with 864×400×1 size. Additionally we
explored FFT based features instead of CQT: LCNNFFT system used truncated
features of size 864 × 400 × 1 and LCNNSWFFT was based on the sliding window
features extraction with 864× 200× 1 window and 90% overlapping along time
axis. Alternative system LCNNSWDWT was based on DWT implementation with
sliding window of 256× 200× 1 size and 83.4% overlapping.
Stacking CNN and RNN We also probed the combined CNN + RNN archi-
tecture from [21] for RA spoofing detection. In this stacked architecture CNN
was used as a feature extractor and RNN modeled the long-term dependencies
of a speech sequence. Both CNN and RNN were optimized jointly through the
back-propagation algorithm. In this implementation CNN+RNN was used as
End-to-End solution.
CNN itself was a reduced version of LCNN. But unlike LCNN from the
previous systems max-pooling was applied with the stride 2 along the frequency
axis to compress frequency information and stride 1 along the time axis to save
time dimensionality.
The RNN part consists of two gated recurrent units [27] forming the bidi-
rectional gated recurrent unit (BGRU). The first GRU was responsible for the
forward pass, while the second GRU performed the backward pass. The last
output vectors of both forward and backward passes were taken further to ob-
tain two 16-dimensional vectors. Such BGRU unit was applied to each channel
of CNN’s output resulting in 16 × 2 × 8 tensor. Weights were shared between
each channel’s unit to prevent overfitting. The flattened output of RNN was
used as an input to the fully-connected layers with MFM activations resulting
in probability of the utterance being spoofed.
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System based on this architecture, CNNFFT + RNN, used truncated features
extracted from log magnitude power FFT spectrum. But due to the limited
computational resources we reduced the input data dimension to 256× 400× 1.
Alternatively we used CNN+RNN architecture for CNN∆EEMD + RNN sys-
tem based on the ensemble empirical mode decomposition (EEMD) features.These
features were obtained by the following algorithm with the use of libEEMD li-
brary [28]:
1. Let So be the FFT spectrogram of the original signal x(t)
2. Get the first empirical mode c1(t) of the signal x(t) using the EEMD with
ensemble size of 50 and noise strength equals to 0.1
√
Var(x(t))
3. Compute Sr as the FFT spectrogram of the signal c1(t)
4. S∆ = |So − Sr|
6 Evaluation results and discussion
The experimental results of all described individual systems on development and
evaluation parts of ASVspoof 2017 corpus are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Evaluation results
Individual system
EER (%)
Dev set Eval set
Baseline 10.35 30.17
BaselineMVN+CMVN 9.85 17.4
SVMi−vec 9.95 12.82
ICNNSWCQT 5.73 15.11
LCNNFFT 4.53 7.34
LCNNSWFFT 5.25 11.91
LCNNCQT 4.80 16.54
LCNNDWT 8.71 16.41
CNNFFT + RNN 7.51 10.68
CNN∆EEMD + RNN 9.94 18.93
Fusion system Dev set Eval set
Primary: LCNNFFT, SVMi−vec, CNNFFT + RNN 3.95 6.73
Contrastive: SVMi−vec, ICNNSWCQT, LCNNFFT, LCNN
SW
FFT, 2.62 7.56
LCNNSWDWT, CNNFFT + RNN, CNN∆EEMD + RNN
The best result for development and evaluation sets was demonstrated by
LCNN system with FFT truncated features. Similar system with CQT-based
features showed poor stability on the evaluation set. This can be explained by
the poor robustness of the CQT features, which is also approved by results of
the baseline system.
The sliding window technique demonstrated worse results compared to the
truncated approach on the evaluation set. A possible reason for this is that using
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spectrograms of the whole utterances (in most cases) as CNN input leads to more
accurate text-dependent deep model.
Our CNN+RNN combination also performed worse RA detection quality
than a single LCNN. We explain performance degradation by the reduced fre-
quency resolution in the spectrum estimation.
Summarizing all results of our individual systems for the final submission of
the ASVspoof 2017 Challenge we prepared two solutions that use fusion of indi-
vidual systems on the score level with Bosaris toolkit [29]. Our primary system
used fusion of LCNNFFT, SVMi−vect and CNNFFT + RNN systems scores. And
our Contrastive system combined SVMi−vec, ICNNSWCQT, LCNNFFT, LCNN
SW
FFT,
LCNNSWDWT, CNNFFT + RNN and CNN∆EEMD + RNN systems. Comparing two
fusion systems on the development and evaluation parts we can see that compli-
cated fusion of 7 systems have less performance than simpler fusion of LCNNFFT,
SVMi−vec, CNNFFT + RNN which are completely different in architectures, fea-
tures and presumably detect different artefacts. Despite the noticeable quality
reduction for some individual systems on the eval part the difference in 1% of
EER for fusion systems can be explained by the impressive results of LCNNFFT.
According to Bosaris fusion model, this system has the biggest weight in both
fusion solutions.However, we suppose that in case of more common RA detection
problem with more various conditions complex system will have better spoofing
detection quality.
7 Conlusions
In this paper we explored the applicability of several different approaches for
replay attack spoofing detection. We investigated state-of-the-art methods from
VC and TTS spoofing detection and deep learning approaches. Our experiments
conducted on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset confirmed high efficiency of deep learn-
ing frameworks for spoofing detection ”in the wild”. EER of the best individual
CNN system was 7.34%. At the same time SVM classifier with high level fea-
tures provides a substantial input into the efficiency of the resulting STC systems
according to the fusion systems results. Our primary system based on systems
score fusion provided 6.73% EER on the evaluation set.
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